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Abstract 
The phenomena of m anipulation of the economy by th e incumbent for electoral 
purpose are called Political Business Cycles (PBC), introduced by Nordhaus (1975). Using 
policy control economic instruments, as fiscal and monetary instruments, government may 
manipulate the economy to gain electoral advantage by producing growth and decreasing 
unemployment before elections.  
In addition to increased public expe nditures, also the produc tion/supply of certain 
publicly provided goods may score improvements. In Albania, production and supply of 
electricity (for the time span  of our a nalyzes) was contr olled by K ESH (Korporata 
Energjitike Shqiptare – Al banian Energy Corporation) whic h is a quasi- m onopoly in the 
supply of electricity in Albania, and it is publicly run. Thr oughout the transition, supply of 
electricity, due to various technical and economic reasons, has not  been stable, and 
characterized by syst ematic interruption for house holds and businesses users, affecting 
their well-being and perform ance (electricity is a main source of energy for  households, 
including heating a nd cooking). Therefore, it seems so that there is an incentive and  
rationale for the incumbent to use also the provision of elect ricity to impress the voters 
before elections, beside of the classical instruments of expenditures.  
In this paper we analyze consumption, production and import of electricity in Albania. 
Our hypothesis is that before elections, elec tricity consumption may increase above usual 
levels, followed by a contractio n after elections. In our analys is we use modern standard 
econometric approach, used widely for research related to PBC. By ARMA modelling it is 
possible to prove if elections can explain cha nges in electricity prod uction, in addition to 
the past history of the variable and the random error term.  
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Albania 
 
1. Introduction 
It seems to be obvious t hat the economic performance of a governmen t 
determines to a large extent  its likelihood of reelection as confirmed by Fair (1978, 
1982, 1988), Madsen (1980) or Lewis-Beck (1988), and therefore economic factors 
influence political factors and the other way around. Furthermore, incumbents may 
use their power and the instruments available to influence the economic environment 
especially prior to election to im prove the likelihood of re election. Over the last 
decades, there has been plenty of res earch and articles pub lished on such an  
opportunistic behaviour of po liticians, aiming to analy ze and explain the use of 
fiscal and m onetary instruments by the incum bent to stim ulate economic 
performance before elections, to im press the voters. The traditional Political 
Business Cycle (PBC) literature, as introduced by Nordhaus (1975), concentrated on 
an exploitable Phillips curve, to explain th e use of econo mic instruments to affect 
macroeconomic variables, such as unem ployment, GDP, etc. Evidence of PBC was 
also found in several less developed and dem ocratic countries. Gimpelsen (2001) 
made a research on the existence of PBC in Russia, finding evidence in support of it. 
Another study of Asutay (2004) provided clear evidence for the presence of PBC in  
Turkey. The incumbent in Turkey has used fiscal and m onetary policy instruments 
to create PBC in order to im prove the chances of being reelected. Also previous 
research on the existence of PBC i n Albania indicated that the incu mbent 
manipulates fiscal instruments, increas ing public expenditure s before elections, 
including public i nvestments, expenditure on com pensation of em ployees in 
parliamentary, social assi stance, while regarding t he macroeconomic outputs, we 
have found, partial evidence of PBC in GDP and unemployment but not in inflation 
(Imami and Lami, 2006). 
After Nordhaus (1975) ini tial contribution there was an increasing resear ch 
interest focusing on budget cycles, based on the observations of Tufte (1978) and 
Frey and Schneider (1978a, b). Even though there is a wide consensus about t he 
importance of the actual econom ic conditions in pleasing the voters, there is still 
doubt about the ability to influence the macroeconomic indicator in a precise  
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predictable manner. Taking the limitations into account, ne wer approaches focused 
on pre-election manipulations of fiscal policy instruments. As shown by Brender and 
Dazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (200 6), especially new dem ocracies are 
vulnerable for such political budget cycles . While Alt and Lasse n (2006) show the 
relevance of transparency, Brender and Dazen (2005) also pronounce the lack of 
experience that voters have in new dem ocracies regarding the ex istence of political 
fiscal cycles. Meanwhile, Shi and Sven sson (2006) see beside the aspect of 
information also the incumbents’ rents of staying in power as a relevant aspect.  
However, incumbents may not use only classical instruments as the composition 
and the size of the public budget if there are also other instruments available. These  
approaches mentioned above  may explain why political budget cycles arise even 
though those voters should punish suc h behaviour. Another pr oblem related to 
political budget cycles is the tim ing of the activity. Since the incumbent cannot 
precisely estimate the lag between the stimulus as a change in the public budget and 
the impact on the econom ic environment, they may be interested to use ot her 
instruments having a m ore direct impact on the economy and the well being of the 
voters.  
We try to shed light on the question, whether incum bents may use other 
instruments available, beside classical fiscal instruments, to impress voter in years of 
election. Based on the results that political  budget cycles seems to be a phenomenon 
of developing countries or new dem ocracies, we focus on Albania, a country with a 
relatively short experience of democracy, which provides only a minimum of fiscal 
transparency (IBP 2009a, b). In t his paper, we focus specifically on electricity,  
which is a publicly provi ded good in Albania and which is characterized by special 
features. Given that electricity represents  one of t he most basic needs, househol ds 
should be highly sensible concerning sufficient supply of electricity. Furthermore, it 
is quite expensive to storage electricity and only for selected purposes, such as 
heating or cooking, substi tutes are availabl e and partly used. Furt hermore, in the 
case of Albania we have a lim ited supply meanwhile de mand has increased 
dramatically after the system  change. And finally,  the Al banian electricity market 
was a quasi public monopoly.  
Given that electricity supply (consum ption) relies l argely on both im ports and 
domestic production, it is important, in this context, to analyze both these sources of 
electricity – in addition to consumption per se. In our paper we analyze consumption 
as well as production and import dynamics of electricity by KESH which is a quasi- 
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monopoly in the suppl y of electricity in Albania, and it is public ly run.1 Our 
hypothesis is that before elections, electri city consumption, production and import 
may increase above usual le vels, followed by a contraction after elections. In t his 
paper we focus on the parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2005 – during that period 
was common to observe electricity supply shortages throughout Albania. In our 
analysis we use m odern standard economet ric approach, used wi dely for research 
related to PBC, aim ing to test if elections can explain ch anges in electricity supply 
in form of production and import. 
In the upcoming chapter we will present a short overview about the electricity 
provision in Albania, to provi de background information concerning t he existing 
undersupply as a precondition for using elec tricity supply as an instrument around 
elections to impress the voters. Chapte r three provides an overview about the 
method and data used while chapter four presents the main findings. 
2. Background of electricity supply and consumption in 
Albania  
Since 1998, Albania has been a net importer of electricity, while the main source 
of domestic production is hydropower plants. In addition to transmission constraints, 
limitations in financing have also ham pered sufficient electricity im ports, implying 
frequent interruptions in power supply si nce 2000. Table 1 gives an overview about 
the development concerning estimated demand, national production, imports and the 
resulting undersupply.  
Table 1. Electricity situation in Albania in GWh 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Demand 6,161 6,223 6,201 6,372 6,517 6,417 
Net Generation 4,709 3,655 3,123 4,818 5,394 5,357 
Net Imports 1,002 1,750 2,227 937 567 385 
Load Shedding 450 818 851 662 556 630 
As percentage of 
Demand 
7.3% 13.1% 13.7% 10.4% 8.5% 9.8% 
Source: World Bank (2006): p.235, own calculations 
                                                           
1 In the time span of our analysis, OSSH (Operatori i Sistemit te Shperndarjes – Distribution 
System Operator) was part of KESH. 
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Major problems are also the low tariffs which do not cover the costs, network 
losses and unpaid bi lls. As a results, the Al banian government has had to subsi dize 
the state own electri city company KESH. In  2005, KESH produced a quasi public 
deficit of 1.8 percent of the GDP, implying losses to be covered by the public budget 
(World Bank: 2006: p 25).  
There are different reasons for interrup tion of electricity. One of the main  
reasons is that more than 95% of electri city production, is based on hydro pow er 
(Nashi 2009), so oscillation in hydro deposit levels, affected by natural factors (rain, 
draught) directly affect the availability of  electricity. The gap, between the demand 
and production, is partia lly covered by im ports, while the remaining gap, not  
covered by dom estic production or im ports (for natural, financ ial or technical 
reasons) is translated into systematic, but oscillating, interruption of electricity.  
Turning to household consumption, Alba nians have still suffered under unmet 
basic needs. In 2002, ba sed on t he non incom e poverty indicators, every third 
Albanian has to be considered as poor a nd every 10th Albani an as extremely poor. 
Indicators as inadequate water and sanitation, inadequate housing, crowding or lack 
of education can only be infl uenced in the longer run. Meanwhile, the supply of 
electricity can be influenced even in the short run, as th e electricity grid has a bro ad 
reach and therefore, electricit y could be virtually everywhere available. In 2002, 
more than 13 percent of the Albanian house holds suffered under power shut offs for 
6 hours or more per day (World Bank, 2003: p. 17).  
Table 2. Frequency of power supply interruption  
 Tirana Urban Rural Total 
Never 28.3 21.7 6.7 13.8 
Several times 
a month 
6.3 8.7 3.4 5.3 
Several times 
a week 
9.8 11.1 6.4 8.3 
Every day 55.6 58.4 83.4 72.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank (2003): p.16 
Table 2 gives an overview of t he frequency of the i nterruptions based again on 
the Living Standard Measurement Surv ey (LSMS) of 2002. The tim e without 
electricity supply varied between m ore than 9 hours in rural areas and 5.6 hours i n 
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the capital Tirana. The situation has im proved in the following years; however, in 
2005 nearly 40 percent still reported daily interruptions of power supply (World 
Bank, 2007: p. 11). 
These irregularities ham per the econo mic development of A lbania as well. In 
2002, more than three out of four firm s stated power supply as a problem  for their 
business, which is m ore than three times  higher com pared to the South East ern 
Region. As a result of the insufficient electri city sector, a loss of 2.7 to 5.4 percent 
of GDP is estimated for 2001-2002. Concerni ng the total costs, we have also to add 
cumulative investments in ba ckup power supplies, roughly of t he same extend the 
direct impact, however, spread over several years (World Bank 2006, p. 239-240). 
3. Method and Data  
3.1 Specifications of Variables, Data and empirical tests 
Since electricity is a n essential good fo r households and busi nesses, we assume 
that the incum bent may try to im prove its supply before elections, by increasing 
production and/or increasing imports. Electricity is an important source of energy in 
Albania. In addition to the wide use in t he industry, electricity is a m ain source of 
heating and cooki ng for households. As  already discussed before, suppl y of 
electricity in Albania, is char acterized by systematic interruptions whose effects 
have been deemed as very negative for development of businesses, especially in 
some sectors, in addition to direct implications for households’ well-being.  
In this research work, we intend to te st for possible statistically significant 
increase of electricity consumption, produc tion and import before elections, in li ne 
with the incumbent interest to “please” v oters, in order to incr ease likelihood to be 
re-elected. The tim e series of production,  imports and consum ption of electricity 
time are on m onthly basis, spanning fr om M1-2000 to M12-2008 (from  January 
2000 to December 2008), adding up to 96 observations. The unit on w hich the data 
analysis is based is MW/H. There are two parliamentary elections taking place in 
this period, namely June 24, 2001 and July 3, 2005. 
Following the standard approach in this field, 2 we will app ly the Inte rvention 
Analysis based on Box and Tiao (1975), a methodology for constructing a statistical 
model in our study. In this paper we test the hypothesis of the existence of changes  
in the supply – as production and im ports – as well as consum ption of electricity. 
Basically the test proceeds by subjecting the monthly seasonally adjusted time series 
                                                           
2 See for exam ple McCallum (1978), Hibbs (1977) , Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina and 
Roubini (1992). Hibbs (1987) offers a good introduction to the Box-Tiao technique. 
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of these variables to a Box-Ti ao intervention analysis using the m ost appropriate 
autoregressive-moving average (ARIMA) for the social process and an intervention 
term; here the intervention term models the time distance to the election day.  
A simple formal representation of the intervention analysis is: 
t t tz I Nμ= + +  
where μ  denotes the mean level, the term It denotes the intervention effect and Nt 
denotes the noise of the tim e series which is modelled using a suitable ARMA(p,q) 
model, 
1 1 1 1... ...t t p t p t t p t qN N N E E Eφ φ θ θ− − − −= + + + − + +  
where Et denotes an independent error sequence.  
The simplest, which corresponds to the t-te st in a non-tim e series setting, is the 
Intervention term/variable, which in this case takes the form of a Pulse Intervention, 
meaning an abrupt jump in the series and then a gradual decline at the normal level 
of the series. Formally the pulse intervention term can be expressed as:  
( )
0
T
t tI Pω=  where ( )TtP  is a pulse function,  ( ) 01
T
t
t T
P
t T
≠⎧= ⎨ =⎩  
The parameter 0ω  measures the change cause d by the intervention a nd is 
estimated along with the ARIMA time seri es component. The estim ation procedure 
provides an estimate of 0ω  and a confidence interval for the parameter. In  our case 
the dependent variable tz  is e ither consumption or production or i mports of 
electricity (each in MW/H) that is assumed to be affected because of elections. The 
intervention variable It is expressed as a binary variable (dummy variable) indicating 
a specific time prior to election, as show n below. And the noi se component of each 
specific dependent variable, tN , is m odelled by an appropria te ARIMA (p,d,q) 
found by following Box-Jenki ns (BJ) Me thodology (1970) as explained in more 
detail below. 
We have created two kinds of political  dummy variables (It) to capture the 
impact of the elections on electricity re lated variables, namely cumulative dummy 
and discrete dummy. Note: For convenience we have denote ( )TtP with PDi standing 
for Political Dummy 
We have six cum ulative election political dummies ( PDi) and each of them i s 
defined as: 
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1
3
0
for the three months prior to election
PD
otherwise
−⎧− = ⎨ −⎩  
1
2
0
for the two months prior to election
PD
otherwise
−⎧− = ⎨ −⎩  
1 ( )
1
0
for the one month prior to election
PD
otherwise
−⎧− = ⎨ −⎩  
and, similarly, PD1, PD2 and PD3, for the m onths after elections. In t he same 
manner we defined three discrete electi ons dummy variables, covering only t he 
monthly and not the cumulative effect of the three months before the election. If the 
election has taken place before the 15th of the month, the month will be counted as 
prior to the election, otherwise as after election. 
3.2 Estimation of the empirical model 
In the first stage, we have followed precisely the Box-Jenkins (BJ) Methodology 
(1970). In the beginning of the process, th e first step was  to remove t he seasonal 
patterns from the time series. Next we carefully investigated on the stationary of the 
time series as a necessity in further steps.  
Based on Box-Tiao’s (1975 ) intervention analysis, after ensuring for the 
stationarity, the time-series is m odelled as ARMA (Auto-Regressive Moving 
Averages). By m odelling through ARMA it is possible to prove if elections can 
explain the changes of the de pendent variable, in additi on to the past hi story of the 
variable and the random  error ter m. Hence, it is necess ary to identify the ARM A 
(p,q) benchmark model. To find the “best” ARM A model for each time series we 
straightforwardly followed Box-Jenkins methodology (1970). He nce, in order t o 
model the analyzed time series as an ARMA we went thought an iterative process of 
identification, estimation and diagnostic checking of several ARMA models until we 
found the most plausible one, deemed as the “best” for each series.3  
As mentioned above, more than 95 percent of the production of electricity comes 
from hydro-power. Therefore, it m ight be po ssible that the external, clim acteric 
factors may affect the above mentioned re sults. This m ay hold for hi gher rainfall 
before the election time and an  increase of the water level in  the cascades of power 
central stations, or t he opposite occurrence after the elec tions. To control for these 
factors we calculate an index of producti on per meter of cascade level (MWH/m) or 
                                                           
3 Gujarati (2003) makes a simple and clear explanation of the Box – Jenkins Methodology. 
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Production/Level (PROLEV) and use it as the dependent variab le in conjunction 
with the election ti ming, instead of si mple production (MWH). Therefore, we 
introduce the cascade level as  an additiona l explanatory variable in the m odel to 
avoid any possible spurious regression problems.  
In the second stage we individually inc orporated each of the political dummy 
variables in the related AR MA model tentatively found i n the first st age and re-
estimated the whole m odel now with an additional incorporated PDi aiming at 
capturing the possible impact of elections on the dependent variable and test whether 
elections have any im pact on the econometri c time-series utilized by this study in 
addition to variable’s past value and its respective error term. Thus, the im pact of 
elections is considered to be an interven tion or shock in the determ ination of the 
value of the analyzed variable by forcing the value of the variable to shift during the 
intervention or shoc k periods. The statis tical significance o f the political dummy  
variables is tested using t-test.  
4. Results and Discussions 
Regarding the supply side of electricity, in both cases the original series were 
non stationary and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests showed significant signs of a 
unit root. We always used first difference to proceed with the analysis. Meanwhil e, 
the first differences of the original series were stationary based on Dickey Fuller test 
and ACF, PACF correlograms.  
After testing and com paring several models the one  with a single m onthly 
seasonal term, MA (12) for production and MA (4) for im ports seemed to be the 
most appropriate model. These models manifested an acceptable fit as their residuals 
presented a pure white noise. 
The first difference of the index Pr oduction/Level (PROLEV) defined as 
MWH/meter of cascade level is stationary  but exhibiting som e seasonal behaviour. 
The “best” m odel tentatively found for PROLEV index seem s to be an ARMA 
model with an AR (2) term (only for the second lag) and a MA (12) term explaining 
the seasonal autocorrelation.  
In case of electricity consum ption, the original series was as well non stationary 
and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests showed significant signs of a unit root. The 
series showed also signs of heteroskedas ticity. We used the  first diffe rence of th e 
natural logarithm which resulted to be stationary. In case of consum ption, the most 
appropriate model tentatively found has two moving average terms, one of lag three 
and the other of lag 12. 
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Table 3. Empirical Results  
Variable Production ProLev Import Consumption
PD-3 104612*** 175.467 41579** 0.05096 
PD-2 159582*** 331.385** 56018** 0.19328*** 
PD-1 206723*** 538.010*** 78087*** 0.23874** 
PD 1 -357776*** -947.486*** -141476** -0.56715*** 
PD 2 -239556*** -605.198*** -47297** -0.30351*** 
PD 3 -170395*** -428.730*** -39395** -0.36262*** 
     
PD-3d -1868 73.1882 9527 -0.24043*** 
PD-2d 110594 1.72618 36947 0.14865 
PD-1d 206723*** 538.010*** 78087*** 0.23874** 
* implies that the result is significant at a 10%, ** at a 5 % level and *** at 1 % percent level.  
Table 3 summarizes the main findings.  Concerning the electricity production, 
the estimated coefficients are also conf irming a “manipulative” behaviour of t he 
incumbent party before the elections. A ll relevant cum ulative political du mmy 
variables have a po sitive sign and are signi ficant at least at 1 percent level. The 
estimated coefficient for PD-1 i mplies an increase by 56 percent of the aver age 
production one m onth prior to elections. 4 The coefficient is higher for PD-1 and 
decreases monotonically for the other tw o dummy variables im plying a stronger 
“manipulative” behaviour of the incum bent as the elections come closer. 
Furthermore, we tested m ore directly the intensific ation of this behaviour by using  
the discrete du mmy variables PDid. It re sults that the estimated parameters ar e 
significant only for PD-1d and not  for the others, implying that the “manipulative” 
attempt focuses strongly on one month prior to elections. Finally, the estimated after 
elections periods param eters show signi ficant decrease of the power production, 
confirming our expectations. Based on the modified setting, which takes into  
account the cascade level (ProLev), we obtain similar results beside the three month 
prior to election result. Therefore, exte rnal, climacteric factors mi ght not hav e 
affected or explained the above mentioned results in production. The findings reflect 
again the intensific ation on the variable difference increasing positively as the 
elections come closer.  
Going on with import of electricity, the estimated coefficients of all cumulative 
political dummy variables have a positive sign and are significant at least at 5 
percent level. Th e cumulative political dum my coefficients show an increasing 
amplitude as the elections day com es closer ( PD-3<PD-2<PD-1). The estimated 
coefficient for PDi shows an average in crease from 42 to 78 GWH in the m onthly 
                                                           
4 In absolute figures, we have an increase of 207 thousand MW/H one month prior to elections, while the average 
production per month is about 370 thousand MW/H. 
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absolute change of imports level prior to elections (DIMP). These chan ges equal 28 
to 51 percent of the average monthly level of imports. The monotonically increasing 
behaviour is also evident when using discrete political dumm y, although the 
dummies related to three and two m onths before elections are not significant in the 
conventional levels. During th e months after elections th ere appears a statistically 
significant and considerable decreas e of the absolute change in the im ports level, 
strengthening the argument for political cycle also in this component. 
Also in the case of electricity consumption the coefficients of the cumul ative 
dummy variables are positive and statistically significant at one percent level excep t 
for three m onths before elections. They  reflect a monthly increase of power 
consumption of roughly 20 percent prior to elections. The major increase in the 
power consumption takes place only during the last month prior to the election day, 
as the second discrete political dumm y (PD2d) is not significant at conventional 
levels and the third one (PD3 d) shows a significant decreas e of about 24 percent of 
power consumption. The contraction aft er the election is also pretty evident and 
statistically significant ranging from  30 to 50 percent of m onthly reduction, in line 
with our expectations.  
In all the variables that we analyzed - imports, production and consumption - the 
derived results provide some evidence that electricity supply is used for the purpose 
of influencing voters before elections. As far as significant, the results reflect the 
expected cyclic b ehaviour of an increas e in the m onth before the election and a 
downturn afterwards. 
 This study shows as far as we know for the first  time in the PBC related 
literature, the use of publicly provided goods, in ge neral, and the use of electricity 
supply, specifically for election purposes, thus bringing a new m odest contribution 
to the PBC theory and empirics. Th ere is a wide consens us that PBC lead to  
inefficient outcomes, and therefore, should be avoided. In our case, the shortages of 
electricity, above usual leve ls, taking pl ace after electi ons, to com pensate for the 
“abundance” of electricity supply before elections, may have negative consequences 
on household and business wellbeing. In this  case we have two scenarios – if the 
incumbent looses elections, it may bl ame the new government for cutting down 
electricity supply after elections (although such a decision is unavoidable norm ally), 
and if it re-wins elections, expects that  “bounded” rational voters will forget 
somehow, after four years, during the next elections, and in their memory will loom 
more the “positive” experience in pre-el ections months before next elections 
compared the “older” bad experiences.  
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Therefore, conducting research on PBC in Albania, and other transition 
countries, and looking into new special features which are not present and explored 
in the current PBC literature, which focu ses mostly in Western countries, and 
publishing the results will contribute to rais ing the awareness of the PBC existence, 
related disadvantages and importance of avoiding this phenomenon.  
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Appendix 
PRODUCTION  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD-1 206723.8 65985.19 3.132882 0.0022 
MA(12) 0.266739 0.096198 2.772822 0.0066 
R-squared 0.126598   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.118280   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 96746.18   Akaike info criterion 25.81608 
Sum squared resid 9.83E+11   Schwarz criterion 25.86604 
Log likelihood -1379.160   Durbin-Watson stat 1.840705 
PD-2 159582.0 46195.30 3.454507 0.0008 
MA(12) 0.270601 0.096207 2.812703 0.0059 
R-squared 0.142002   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133830   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 95889.27   Akaike info criterion 25.79829 
Sum squared resid 9.65E+11   Schwarz criterion 25.84825 
Log likelihood -1378.209   Durbin-Watson stat 1.921842 
PD-3 104612.7 38707.52 2.702645 0.0080 
MA(12) 0.246735 0.096984 2.544068 0.0124 
R-squared 0.108998   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.100512   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 97716.11   Akaike info criterion 25.83604 
Sum squared resid 1.00E+12   Schwarz criterion 25.88599 
Log likelihood -1380.228   Durbin-Watson stat 1.989454 
PD-2d 110594.2 68783.87 1.607851 0.1109 
MA(12) 0.223662 0.097331 2.297948 0.0235 
R-squared 0.070927   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.062079   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 99781.86   Akaike info criterion 25.87788 
Sum squared resid 1.05E+12   Schwarz criterion 25.92783 
Log likelihood -1382.466   Durbin-Watson stat 2.140868 
PD-3d -1868.409 69814.02 -0.026763 0.9787 
MA(12) 0.212600 0.097568 2.178991 0.0316 
R-squared 0.048186   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.039121   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 100995.7   Akaike info criterion 25.90206 
Sum squared resid 1.07E+12   Schwarz criterion 25.95202 
Log likelihood -1383.760   Durbin-Watson stat 2.047774 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD1 -357776.9 59876.55 -5.975242 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.243177 0.097426 2.496025 0.0141 
R-squared 0.288952   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.282180   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 87292.35   Akaike info criterion 25.61043 
Sum squared resid 8.00E+11   Schwarz criterion 25.66039 
Log likelihood -1368.158   Durbin-Watson stat 1.913812 
PD2 -239556.4 43245.85 -5.539408 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.244068 0.097422 2.505267 0.0138 
R-squared 0.263995   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.256985   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 88811.09   Akaike info criterion 25.64493 
Sum squared resid 8.28E+11   Schwarz criterion 25.69488 
Log likelihood -1370.004   Durbin-Watson stat 2.149879 
PD3 -170395.7 36824.68 -4.627214 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.222703 0.098214 2.267524 0.0254 
R-squared 0.210971   Mean dependent var -508.1121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.203456   S.D. dependent var 103031.1 
S.E. of regression 91954.55   Akaike info criterion 25.71449 
Sum squared resid 8.88E+11   Schwarz criterion 25.76445 
Log likelihood -1373.725   Durbin-Watson stat 2.097978 
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ProLev 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD1 538.0099 203.3373 2.645898 0.0094 
AR(2) -0.234087 0.096951 -2.414490 0.0175 
MA(12) 0.464369 0.087796 5.289184 0.0000 
R-squared 0.297506   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283732   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 332.6447   Akaike info criterion 14.48018 
Sum squared resid 11286554   Schwarz criterion 14.55601 
Log likelihood -757.2096   Durbin-Watson stat 1.956480 
PD2 331.3849 150.1460 2.207085 0.0295 
AR(2) -0.170470 0.098373 -1.732893 0.0861 
MA(12) 0.440578 0.089361 4.930312 0.0000 
R-squared 0.278732   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.264589   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 337.0605   Akaike info criterion 14.50656 
Sum squared resid 11588196   Schwarz criterion 14.58238 
Log likelihood -758.5942   Durbin-Watson stat 2.052477 
PD3 175.4670 113.1892 1.550210 0.1242 
AR(2) -0.239724 0.096877 -2.474510 0.0150 
MA(12) 0.440256 0.089642 4.911284 0.0000 
R-squared 0.268081   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.253730   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 339.5399   Akaike info criterion 14.52122 
Sum squared resid 11759311   Schwarz criterion 14.59704 
Log likelihood -759.3638   Durbin-Watson stat 2.108063 
PD-2d 1.726181 211.9958 0.008143 0.9935 
AR(2) -0.265941 0.096104 -2.767223 0.0067 
MA(12) 0.434439 0.090368 4.807425 0.0000 
R-squared 0.251364   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.236684   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 343.3957   Akaike info criterion 14.54380 
Sum squared resid 12027901   Schwarz criterion 14.61963 
Log likelihood -760.5495   Durbin-Watson stat 2.178206 
PD-3d 73.18816 210.6066 0.347511 0.7289 
AR(2) -0.276882 0.095845 -2.888862 0.0047 
MA(12) 0.436933 0.090078 4.850601 0.0000 
R-squared 0.252160   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.237496   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 343.2130   Akaike info criterion 14.54273 
Sum squared resid 12015105   Schwarz criterion 14.61856 
Log likelihood -760.4936   Durbin-Watson stat 2.179767 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD1 -947.4864 185.0989 -5.118812 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.300237 0.095930 -3.129768 0.0023 
MA(12) 0.491610 0.084984 5.784741 0.0000 
R-squared 0.406963   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.395335   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 305.6331   Akaike info criterion 14.31080 
Sum squared resid 9527979.   Schwarz criterion 14.38663 
Log likelihood -748.3171   Durbin-Watson stat 2.072460 
PD2 -605.1977 147.9213 -4.091350 0.0001 
AR(2) -0.174401 0.103142 -1.690875 0.0939 
MA(12) 0.460800 0.087766 5.250326 0.0000 
R-squared 0.362272   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.349767   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 316.9401   Akaike info criterion 14.38346 
Sum squared resid 10246003   Schwarz criterion 14.45929 
Log likelihood -752.1315   Durbin-Watson stat 2.261936 
PD3 -428.7299 103.2773 -4.151251 0.0001 
AR(2) -0.280074 0.095896 -2.920605 0.0043 
MA(12) 0.471912 0.087458 5.395893 0.0000 
R-squared 0.361134   Mean dependent var 6.924762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.348607   S.D. dependent var 393.0454 
S.E. of regression 317.2227   Akaike info criterion 14.38524 
Sum squared resid 10264283   Schwarz criterion 14.46107 
Log likelihood -752.2251   Durbin-Watson stat 2.206271 
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IMPORT 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD-1 78087.48 32282.64 2.418869 0.0173 
MA(4) -0.240877 0.095787 -2.514709 0.0134 
R-squared 0.075551   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.066746   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 46952.36   Akaike info criterion 24.37017 
Sum squared resid 2.31E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.42013 
Log likelihood -1301.804   Durbin-Watson stat 2.170655 
PD-2 56018.48 22979.75 2.437732 0.0165 
MA(4) -0.214867 0.096719 -2.221561 0.0285 
R-squared 0.079247   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.070478   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 46858.40   Akaike info criterion 24.36616 
Sum squared resid 2.31E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.41612 
Log likelihood -1301.590   Durbin-Watson stat 2.231117 
Inverted MA Roots    .68    .00-.68i  -.00+.68i    -.68 
PD-3 41578.98 18804.68 2.211097 0.0292 
MA(4) -0.225347 0.096366 -2.338454 0.0213 
R-squared 0.069364   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.060501   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 47109.20   Akaike info criterion 24.37684 
Sum squared resid 2.33E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.42680 
Log likelihood -1302.161   Durbin-Watson stat 2.218977 
PD-2d 36946.79 33406.46 1.105977 0.2713 
MA(4) -0.171890 0.097468 -1.763556 0.0807 
R-squared 0.039498   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.030351   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 47859.15   Akaike info criterion 24.40843 
Sum squared resid 2.41E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.45839 
Log likelihood -1303.851   Durbin-Watson stat 2.320321 
PD-3d 9527.190 33472.87 0.284624 0.7765 
MA(4) -0.179690 0.097089 -1.850784 0.0670 
R-squared 0.029005   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.019757   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 48119.86   Akaike info criterion 24.41929 
Sum squared resid 2.43E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.46925 
Log likelihood -1304.432   Durbin-Watson stat 2.267663 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD1 -141475.7 30321.01 -4.665930 0.0000 
MA(4) -0.219792 0.096595 -2.275384 0.0249 
R-squared 0.194252   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.186578   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 43834.46   Akaike info criterion 24.23274 
Sum squared resid 2.02E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.28270 
Log likelihood -1294.452   Durbin-Watson stat 1.988356 
PD2 -47296.97 23273.30 -2.032241 0.0447 
MA(4) -0.174277 0.097359 -1.790039 0.0763 
R-squared 0.065129   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.056225   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 47216.28   Akaike info criterion 24.38138 
Sum squared resid 2.34E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.43134 
Log likelihood -1302.404   Durbin-Watson stat 2.275984 
PD3 -39394.73 18968.96 -2.076799 0.0403 
MA(4) -0.177736 0.097255 -1.827525 0.0705 
R-squared 0.066670   Mean dependent var 645.1963 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057782   S.D. dependent var 48602.39 
S.E. of regression 47177.34   Akaike info criterion 24.37973 
Sum squared resid 2.34E+11   Schwarz criterion 24.42969 
Log likelihood -1302.316   Durbin-Watson stat 2.178401 
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CONSUMPTION 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD-1 0.238741 0.091810 2.600388 0.0107 
MA(3) -0.606766 0.050723 -11.96223 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.563441 0.036774 15.32181 0.0000 
R-squared 0.296999   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283480   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.165634   Akaike info criterion -0.730436 
Sum squared resid 2.853199   Schwarz criterion -0.655497 
Log likelihood 42.07834   Durbin-Watson stat 2.201854 
PD-2 0.193277 0.063621 3.037941 0.0030 
MA(3) -0.570620 0.051484 -11.08340 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.571557 0.038386 14.88970 0.0000 
R-squared 0.309743   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.296469   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.164126   Akaike info criterion -0.748730 
Sum squared resid 2.801478   Schwarz criterion -0.673791 
Log likelihood 43.05705   Durbin-Watson stat 2.146566 
PD-3 0.050962 0.053885 0.945752 0.3465 
MA(3) -0.583645 0.051783 -11.27097 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.577459 0.037180 15.53158 0.0000 
R-squared 0.257044   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.242756   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.170276   Akaike info criterion -0.675157 
Sum squared resid 3.015363   Schwarz criterion -0.600218 
Log likelihood 39.12089   Durbin-Watson stat 2.358291 
PD-2d 0.148651 0.093994 1.581488 0.1168 
MA(3) -0.570420 0.053127 -10.73697 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.582475 0.039436 14.77020 0.0000 
R-squared 0.267866   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.253787   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.169031   Akaike info criterion -0.689831 
Sum squared resid 2.971437   Schwarz criterion -0.614892 
Log likelihood 39.90597   Durbin-Watson stat 2.390489 
PD-3d -0.240430 0.086594 -2.776513 0.0065 
MA(3) -0.608685 0.053395 -11.39966 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.595295 0.039856 14.93617 0.0000 
R-squared 0.299437   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.285965   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.165346   Akaike info criterion -0.733910 
Sum squared resid 2.843304   Schwarz criterion -0.658971 
Log likelihood 42.26419   Durbin-Watson stat 2.289615 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
PD1 -0.567149 0.076166 -7.446215 0.0000 
MA(3) -0.539565 0.050076 -10.77498 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.599346 0.034663 17.29047 0.0000 
R-squared 0.509810   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500384   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.138310   Akaike info criterion -1.091002 
Sum squared resid 1.989484   Schwarz criterion -1.016063 
Log likelihood 61.36859   Durbin-Watson stat 2.247625 
PD2 -0.303513 0.057970 -5.235713 0.0000 
MA(3) -0.554674 0.055018 -10.08162 0.0000 
MA(12) 0.610965 0.034441 17.73968 0.0000 
R-squared 0.408762   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.397392   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.151898   Akaike info criterion -0.903576 
Sum squared resid 2.399597   Schwarz criterion -0.828637 
Log likelihood 51.34132   Durbin-Watson stat 2.487681 
PD3 -0.362618 0.067603 -5.363946 0.0000 
MA(3) -0.093596 0.099240 -0.943136 0.3478 
MA(12) 0.342293 0.090448 3.784420 0.0003 
R-squared 0.343131   Mean dependent var -0.000110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.330499   S.D. dependent var 0.195675 
S.E. of regression 0.160107   Akaike info criterion -0.798310 
Sum squared resid 2.665967   Schwarz criterion -0.723371 
Log likelihood 45.70959   Durbin-Watson stat 2.159000 
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